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Simon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
1995 WL 604602 (2D CIR. 1995).
INTRODUCTION
Richard and Fiona Simon ("Simon"), professional musicians, brought suit
against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") seeking a rede-
termination of a notice of deficiency issued to them for taking depreciation de-
ductions for two nineteenth century violin bows. The United States Tax Court
held that plaintiffs were entitled to depreciation deductions, finding that the bows
qualified for business depreciation deductions.' The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding the violin bows were subject to
the allowance for depreciation under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
("ACRS").2
FACTS
Plaintiffs Richard and Fiona Simon are nationally recognized and accom-
plished concert violinists. Since 1965, Mr. Simon has been a member of the first
violin section of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, as well as a soloist,
chamber musician and teacher. Ms. Simon joined the New York Philharmonic in
1985 as a member of the first violin section and has also been a soloist, chamber
musician, teacher and full-time performer.
In 1985, the Simons' purchased two antique violin bows ("the Tourte bows")
created in the nineteenth century by Francois Tourte, a legendary bowmaker
renowned for his improvements in bow design. When purchased, the Tourte
bows were in relatively pristine condition and had rarely been used since their
creation. The Simons used these bows regularly in their occupation as profes-
sional musicians. In the 1989 tax year in question, the Simons performed four
concerts a week in addition to numerous rehearsals with the Philharmonic. This
use subjected the bows to substantial wear and diminished their value as playable
musical instruments. Accordingly, the Simons claimed depreciation deductions
1. Simon v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 247 (1994).
2. In a similar but unrelated case, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Liddle v. Comm'r, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995), decided the same issue as the present case. Brian
Liddle, a professional musician, challenged the Commissioner's denial of a depreciation deduction for
a seventeenth century Ruggeri bass violin. Mr. Liddle claimed he was entitled to a depreciation de-
duction under the ACRS for the wear and tear of the antique instrument he used in his trade. The
Tax Court held in favor of the plaintiff, and the Commissioner appealed. On appeal, a unanimous
court held that the antique violin was property subject to exhaustion and wear and tear and therefore,
was "recovery property" that could be depreciated under the ACRS. Following the court's decision,
the Commissioner for Internal Revenue withheld comment in anticipation of the holding in the case
at bar.
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for the two bows on their 1989 Tax Form 1040 in the amounts of $6,300 and
$4,515.
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the Simons in 1991, con-
testing the Simons' depreciation deduction for the wear of the antique violin
bows under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA").3 The Commissioner claimed the bows were depre-
ciable under ACRS only if the plaintiffs could prove the "useful life" of each
bow under the law which applied prior to the enactment of the ARCS in 1981.
Additionally, the Commissioner argued that the useful lives of the bows were
indeterminable because the bows were works of art which appreciated in value
and therefore, did not have useful lives. The United States Tax Court held that
the standard for a "determinable useful life" which the Commission sought to
employ no longer applied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, holding that the ACRS "recovery property" standard was the
correct means of determining whether property was entitled to a depreciation
deduction.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the Second Circuit was to what extent, if any, the ACRS
modified the determinable useful life requirement, allowing goods to be consid-
ered as depreciable property. In allowing depreciation deductions for the Tourte
bows, the court held that the bows could be considered "recovery property"
under the ACRS. The court, in formulating its conclusion, addressed and dis-
counted three principle contentions of the Commissioner. First, the court rejected
the Commissioner's claim that the application of "recovery property" to musical
instruments is contrary to the intent of the ERTA. Second, the court refused to
accept the Commissioner's assertion that the word "character" should be read
into the requirement that tangible property have a demonstrable useful life. Third,
the court rejected the Commissioner's claim that his interpretation of the statute
de-emphasizes useful life by mandating "the establishment of demonstrable use-
ful life for only a 'narrow category' of property."4 Finally, the court discussed
the potential ramifications of its holding.
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the text of the ACRS provi-
sion of Internal Revenue Code, section 168, which provides for a depreciation
deduction for "recovery property" placed into service after 1980.' "Recovery
property" is defined as "tangible property of a character subject to the allowance
of depreciation" when "used in a trade or business, or... held for the produc-
tion of income." Both parties stipulated that the phrase "of a character subject
to depreciation" must be read in light of I.R.C. §167(a).7 The United States Tax
3. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (1995).
4. Simon v. Comm'r, 1995 WL 604602 *1, *4 (2d Cir. 1995).
5. The court explained that this appeal was concerned only with Internal Revenue Code as it
existed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
6. I.R.C. § 168(c)(1) (1995).
7. I.R.C. § 167(1). The relevant portions read:
[Vol. VI: 153
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Court held that when read in light of the plain language of section 167, the
Tourte bows may qualify as recovery property under section 168 if they suffer
wear and tear from the Simons' trade.'
The court dismissed the Commissioner's primary contention that the Tax
Court's interpretation of section 168 was contrary to congressional intent. The
Commissioner argued that because all property used in a trade or business will
suffer wear and tear, the Tax Court's interpretation of section 168 would effec-
tively render the phrase "of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation"
contrary to congressional intent. The court summarily dismissed this claim, ex-
plaining that "some tangible assets used in business are not exhausted, do not
suffer wear and tear, or become obsolete."9 The court explained that many as-
sets, such as art in a law firm, do not generally suffer wear and tear and do not
possess a determinable useful life. The court reasoned that the Tourte bows are
not museum pieces, but playable musical instruments. Had they been placed in a
for-profit museum, the bows could not have a claimed depreciation value be-
cause they would not have been used in a trade or business. Consequently, the
court held that the bows were used in a trade, as well as subject to wear and
tear.
The court also discounted the Commissioner's second contention that congres-
sional intent and the notion of depreciation itself mandate reading the word
"character" into the definition of "demonstrable useful life."'" The court ex-
plained that throughout their history, tax laws have always allowed depreciation
deductions for certain income producing assets used in a trade or business."
Traditionally, the rationale of the deduction was to allow taxpayers to match the
cost of an asset to the income derived from the asset. In its modem form, the
depreciation deduction was determined by the "period of time that the asset
would produce income in the taxpayer's business."' 2 The court cited precedent
exclaiming that the congressional intent for the depreciation allowance was not to
serve as a tool for taxpayer profit, but as a means of protection from losses. In
General Rule. There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) -
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of
income. In case of recovery property (within the meaning of section 168), the deduction
allowable under section 168 shall be deemed to constitute the reasonable allowance pro-
vided by this section.
8. Simon v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 247, 260 (1994).
9. Simon v. Comm'r, 1995 WL 604602 *1, *2 (2d Cir. 1995).
10. I.R.C. § 168. The relevant portions read:
(a) Allowance of deduction. There shall be allowed as a deduction for any taxable year the
amount determined under this section with respect to recovery property. - (c) Recovery
Property. For the purposes of this title - (1) recovery property defined. Except as provid-
ed in subsection (e), the term "recovery property" means tangible property of a character
subject to the allowance for depreciation - (A) used in a trade or business, or (B) held
for the production of income.
11. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 167; Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1067; I.R.C.
§ 23(l)(1939); I.R.C. § 167(a)(1954).
12. Simon, 1995 WL 604602 at *3.
1995]
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order for profitable accounting practices, the court explained that "correct tabula-
tions, not artificial ones, [must] be used."' 3
Furthermore, the court explained that the concept of "determinable useful life"
evolved because it was a necessary element in the equation to calculate proper
annual allowances to compensate for the original cost of an item over time. The
court elucidated two reasons why it was rejecting the determinable useful life
requirement relied upon by the Commissioner. First, Congress created the ACRS
accelerated depreciation periods as a stimulus for economic growth. 4 Under
ACRS, a predetermined period is created to recover the cost of an asset which is
unrelated to and often shorter than the useful life of the asset. Additionally, the
court noted that the depreciation deductions often do not remain consistent
throughout the asset's life. As a result, the court held that the determinable use-
ful life requirement was no longer needed to calculate depreciation under the
ACRS.1 5
The court cited that congressional intent to simplify depreciation rules served
as a second reason for rejection of the determinable useful life requirement. The
court reasoned that numerous attempts failed to simplify a working definition for
concepts such as useful life and salvage value, which resulted in numerous dis-
putes between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service. 6 The court then af-
firmed the conclusion of the Tax Court that to require a taxpayer to prove the
useful life of personal property before it may be depreciated over the 3-year or
5-year period required by the statute would "bring the [Tax] Court back to pre-
ERTA law and reintroduce the disagreements that the Congress intended to elim-
inate by its enactment of ERTA."'7
The Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's third contention that by hold-
ing the determinable useful life requirement applicable, only a "narrow category"
of property would be affected. The Commissioner contended that depreciation
deductions should not be taken for property which retains value after use in a
business. In rejecting this theory, the court explained that "useful life is mea-
sured by the use in a taxpayer's business, not by the full abstract economic life
of the asset in a business."' 8
In reaching its conclusion, the court, once again, acknowledged and rejected
the Commissioner's claim that Congress intended to maintain the determinable
useful life requirement. The Commissioner cited a house conference report stat-
ing that business assets "that do not decline in value on the predictable basis or
that do not have a determinable useful life, such as land goodwill, and stock, are
13. Id. (citing Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960)).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1981); S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47 (1981).
15. The court stated that the useful life concept could be applied under the ACRS to determine
whether recovery property is a 3-year or 5-year class property. Simon, 1995 WL 604602 at n.4 (citing
Simon v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 247,264 (1994)).
16. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 14, at 47.
17. Simon, 1995 WL 604602 at *4 (citing Simon, 103 T.C. at 263).
18. Id. (citing Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 97 (1960)).
[Vol. VI: 153
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 15
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/15
1995] SIMON v. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE 157
not depreciable."' 9 Without contesting the congressional intent of such a state-
ment, the court stated that it "cannot employ two sentences in a legislative report
to trump statutory language and a clearly stated legislative purpose."2 The court
stated that it must rely on the overall legislative history repudiating the scheme
of "complex depreciation rules" and not the remarks of one legislative statement.
In affirming the statutory integrity of ERTA, the court held that for the purposes
of the recovery property provisions, "'property subject to the allowance for
depreciation' means property that is subject to exhaustion, wear and tear, or
obsolescence."
21
As a final note, the court discussed the potential ramifications of its conclu-
sion that the determinable useful life standard is not to be used in conjunction
with defining recovery property under section 168. The court acknowledged that
its holding may allow the cost of some business decisions regarded as "waste-
ful," such as a law office's purchase of expensive desks, to be depreciated under
the current holding. The court rationalized that the congressional intent of ERTA
was to simulate the economy and such purchases and subsequent deductions are
the results of such a policy. Finally, the Court cautioned that its holding would
not promote or encourage taxpayers to "hoard and depreciate valuable property
that a taxpayer expects to appreciate in real economic value." Instead, the
court re-stated that the test is "whether property will suffer exhaustion, wear and
tear, or obsolescence in its use by a business."' The court noted that its deci-
sion is limited only to "recovery property."
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that for purposes of defin-
ing recovery property, the ACRS precludes the usage of the determinable useful
life requirement in determining whether business property is allowed a tax de-
duction for depreciation. The plaintiffs' Tourte bows were held as recovery prop-
erty and subject to the allowance for depreciation provided by ERTA. Further-
more, while the court rejected all of the Commissioner's arguments for incorpo-
rating the determinable useful life requirement into section 186 of the ERTA, the
court did restrict its holding as applicable only to business goods purchased
between January 1, 1981 and January 1, 1987.
Jeff Levick
19. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1981).
20. Simon, 1995 WL 604602 at *4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *5.
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